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The Issue 
Trade  liberalization  scenarios  are  often  evaluated  using  sophisticated  programming 
models that rely on a number of assumptions related to demand and supply parameters. 
One challenge researchers often encounter in the calibration of dairy trade liberalization 
models  is  to  identify  the  supply  response  of  producers  under  production  quotas.  The 
existence of production quotas in the Canadian dairy industry implies departures from 
standard marginal cost pricing. Under traditional net present value models, an assumption 
about the discount factors attached to production quotas must be made to infer the supply 
response of Canadian dairy producers following a change in the economic environment 
(e.g., import tariffs). The Individual Export Milk (IEM) program in Quebec generated an 
opportunity  to  estimate  dairy  producers’  discount  factors  for  production  quotas 
conditional on different assumptions about structural parameters such as producers’ risk 
preferences and cost efficiency. 
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Implications and Conclusions 
Different assumptions about production quotas’ discount rates are used in different trade 
policy simulation models (e.g., Cox et al., 1999, and Meilke, Sarker and Le Roy, 1998). 
Meilke, Sarker and Le Roy use a discount rate of 20 percent and state that it is “… in the 
mid-range  of  discount  rates  estimated  by  …  economists.”  As  they  note,  estimates  of 
discount  rates  in  the  literature  vary  wildly.  The  current  article  estimates  that  annual 
discount rates range from approximately 8 percent to 12.5 percent in May 2001 and May 
2002.  These  estimates  are  conditional  on  the  producers’  degree  of  risk  aversion, 
producers’  cost  efficiency  and  the  non-stochastic  return  on  the  export  market.  The 
estimates of the discount rate are relatively greater than the commercial risk-free interest 
rate on government bonds or returns on other risk-free assets sometimes used to discount 
quota values; however, they are also smaller than previously computed discount rates 
(e.g., Chen and Meilke, 1998). 
Background 
A ruling of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body in October 1999 forced the Canadian dairy 
industry to reform dairy export mechanisms in the fall of 2000. An electronic marketplace 
for exports of dairy products, known as the Individual Export Milk (IEM) program, was 
implemented in Quebec (and in other provinces). Under this program, export milk was 
sold directly to processors without the intervention of the national supply management 
system. The IEM program was subsequently successfully challenged by New Zealand and 
the United States, and the program ceased to exist in early 2003. The current analysis 
seizes the opportunity created by the existence of the IEM programs to produce iso-utility 
lines that determine threshold values for the discount rate conditional on risk preferences, 
cost efficiency and a given export price. 
The Economic Model 
A portfolio model is built to derive optimal purchases of export contracts and domestic 
production  quotas  by  dairy  producers.  Let      and  1     represent  the  shares  of  milk 
allocated to the domestic and export markets respectively under the existence of the IEM 
program.  Assuming that output of dairy producers is pre-determined and that variable 
costs are constant, the per-unit profit function is  
 
    =   p
d  r    p
q ( )  + p
x 1   ( ) c,            (1) 
where   p
d ,  p
x and    p
q represent the domestic price of milk, the export price of a contract 
offered to a producer and the auction equilibrium price of production quotas, respectively. 
The symbol ~ denotes randomness in a variable, c is the constant average variable cost of 
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converts kg of butterfat per day into hectolitre of milk produced in a year      3.6 365 ( ).
2 
Therefore  r    p
q  is the opportunity cost of holding production quotas in a period. 
The current analysis differs from that of Turvey, Weersink and Martin (2003) in a 
fundamental way: the timing of decisions and the assumptions about what is known to 
producers when they make their decisions are different. It is assumed that the equilibrium 
quota value on the auction market is the relevant short-term random variable from the 
producers’ perspective, rather than the export price. Quebec dairy producers were aware 
of  the  most  profitable  export  contract  available  before  making  irreversible  delivery 
allocation  decisions  with  respect  to  the  export  and  domestic  markets.  Given  that  the 
output level is predetermined in our model, the risk faced by producers stems from the 
uncertain opportunity cost of one period of time of not owning the quota. Producers that 
do  not  enter  into  a  binding  agreement  to  sell  on  the  export  market  through  the  IEM 
program at the beginning of a period must either sell their output in the within-quota 
domestic market, if they possess a corresponding quantity of quotas, or sell in the over-
quota market at world prices.
3  
Numerical simulations are used to solve the optimal ratio of quota purchases (or sales) 
over total output for Quebec dairy producers under the IEM program.  As  Tomek and 
Peterson (2001) point out, three empirical issues need to be addressed before proceeding 
with the simulations. First, the relevant parameters of the probability distribution of the 
random  variables  must  be  estimated.  The  second  and  third  steps  must  specify  the 
objective  function  of  producers  and  explain  the  simulation  algorithm.  There  are  two 
random variables in the model from the producers’ perspective: i) the equilibrium price of 
the production quota and ii) the domestic price of raw milk. Suppose that the conditional 
distribution of these variables can be modelled as  
 
  pt
q =  0 + 1pt
x + 2 
pt
x
2 + 3WTOt + 1t  and          (2) 
   pt
d =  1Targett + 2t ,              (3) 
where   1t  is a random error term distributed normally,  pt
x represents the average price of 
all export contracts offered to producers at time t, WTOt is a dummy variable which equals 
zero for the period preceding December 2001 and one onward, and   
pt
x
2 is the negative 
semi-variance  of  all  export  contracts  offered  to  producers  at  time  t  defined  as 
kfwf pf
x   p
x ( ) f=1
F  
2
W . The variable  wf  is the volume of the export contract,  kf is an 
index function taking the value of one if  pf
x   p
x  and zero otherwise, and F and W are 
respectively  the  total  quantity  of  contracts  available  and  the  total  volume  of  export 
contracts. In equation (3),  2t  is a random error term distributed normally and the variable 
Target  is the target price of the Canadian Dairy Commission based on cost of production 
estimates.  
The  Quebec  domestic  farm  milk  price  is  an  average  price  based  on  a  reference 
hectolitre with 3.6 percent of butterfat, 3.2 percent of protein and 5.7 percent of other Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  M. Doyon, C. Brodeur and J-P. Gervais 
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solids. The IEM program was administered by an independent agency, and export prices 
for each contract settled between producers and processors are publicly available. The 
independent variables of the forecast model were selected to balance the necessity for 
producers to form their subjective distribution of prices using all information available 
and the desire to keep the model parsimonious in terms of the number of parameters to 
estimate. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test for the null hypothesis of a diagonal 
variance-covariance  matrix  of  residuals  produces  a  statistic  of  0.05  (p-value  of  0.83). 
Thus, there are no efficiency gains related to estimating the forecast equations jointly. 
OLS estimates for each equation are reported in table 1, along with their standard errors 
between parentheses. All independent variables are statistically different from zero at the 
90 percent confidence level and have the expected algebraic sign. The statistical fit of 
each  equation  is  good,  as  the  adjusted  R
2  measures  in  (2)  and  (3)  are  0.90  and  0.89 
respectively.  
Simulation 
The final task involves specifying the objective function the producer optimizes. Suppose 
that the utility function of the producer is of the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) 
type:  
U   ( )=










 ,              (4) 
where     is the Arrow-Pratt relative risk aversion parameter. This is a convenient way to 
approximate producers’ risk preferences, and it has the advantage of not assuming that 
risk preferences are independent from initial wealth level. The CRRA assumption implies 
that absolute risk aversion is decreasing in wealth. The empirical strategy is as follows. 
Table 1  OLS estimates for the prediction equations 
Quota equilibrium price  Domestic price 
Variables  Estimates  Variables  Estimates 
Constant,   0   349.35 
(13.10) 
Target price,   1  0.95 
(0.01) 
Average export price,   1  -2.98 
(0.44) 
   
Negative semi-variance,   2   3.70 
(2.15) 
   
WTO dummy,   3   18.73 
(5.14) 
   
Note: The numbers between parentheses are the standard errors associated with each coefficient. Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  M. Doyon, C. Brodeur and J-P. Gervais 
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Two random shocks are drawn from a univariate normal distribution  N 0, i
2 ( )  using the 
variance of the estimated residuals in (2) and (3). The random quota price and domestic 
price are computed using the random forecast errors in the prediction model in (2) - (3), 
conditional on a set of predetermined variables. This procedure is repeated 50,000 times 
to compute that many realizations of the random profit function defined in (1). 
A non-linear optimization algorithm is used to maximize expected utility of profit 
over the choice variable     in (1). Solving the optimization problem requires calibrating 
the annual discount rate r ( ), the risk aversion parameter    ( ) and the marginal cost c ( ) . 
The empirical strategy is thus to build a grid search over the potential values of the annual 
discount  rate  for  given  values  of      and  c   such  that  producers  will  choose  to  sell 
production exclusively on the domestic market   =1 ( ). This is achieved by averaging out 
the utility realizations of the 50,000 random draws and optimizing over the variable  . 
That optimization procedure is repeated ten times and the average optimal proportion is 
used  to  determine  the  iso-utility  lines  relating  the  price  of  export  contracts  and  the 
discount factor of production quotas. The grid search procedure is assumed successful 
when the optimization procedure yields a value within 0.01 of the desired level   =1 ( ). 
Results 
Two different optimization scenarios were computed. The first one relates to export milk 
deliveries occurring in May 2001, and the second relates to May 2002, a period of higher 
quota price. Estimates of marginal costs are not readily available, but average variable 
costs have been estimated for the province of Quebec in Levallois and Perrier (2001). 
They  report  that  average  variable  costs  range  from  $16.30  per  hl  to  $25.05  per  hl 
depending  on  various  factors  that  are  farm-specific.  Based  on  these  estimates,  the 
portfolio model solves the optimization routine for three different levels of marginal costs: 
$16, $20 and $24 per hl.  
Simulations for May 2001 
Figure 1 illustrates various iso-utility lines for a producer with an average variable cost of 
$20 per hectolitre, according to his/her coefficient of relative risk aversion. The horizontal 
axis lists the different prices of export contracts available in May 2001. The iso-utility 
lines plot the maximum value of the quota discount rate for which the producer would not 
be willing to participate in the export market. For example, a producer with marginal 
variable costs of 20$ per hl and a coefficient of relative risk aversion of two will not 
participate in the commercial export milk program if his/her discount rate is lower than 
8.7 percent, given that the most profitable export contract available is priced at $35.09 per 
hl (figure 1). If that producer accepts to supply milk for export at $35.09 per hl, it implies 
that he/she discounts the production quota at a higher rate than 8.7 percent. The same 
producer will accept an export contract priced at $29.03 per hl if his/her discount rate of 
the quota is greater than 10.9 percent on an annual basis. The positive slope of the iso-Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  M. Doyon, C. Brodeur and J-P. Gervais 
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utility line has an intuitive justification.
4 The maximum discount rate of the quota must be 
inversely proportional to export prices to guarantee that a producer will not participate in 
the commercial export milk program. Thus, the iso-utility lines generated by the model 
yield  discount  rates  for  dairy  trade  models  that  are  a  function  of  cost  efficiency  and 
degrees of risk aversion. 
Consider next the case in which producers have risk preferences that yield a CRRA 
coefficient of 0.5. In terms of risk aversion, the current hypothetical producer is less risk 
averse  than  when  = 2 ,  and  thus  willing  to  pay  a  lesser  amount  to  avoid  the  risks 
associated with dairy quota transactions. If the producer is offered an export contract of 
$35.09 per hl, the maximum value of the discount rate is higher (8.8 percent) than when 
the  producer  is  less  risk  averse,  ceteris  paribus.  The  smaller  degree  of  risk  aversion 
implies that a producer will not dislike variability in the domestic price of milk and the 
price of the production quota for domestic deliveries as much as another producer with a 
larger  relative  risk  aversion  coefficient.  Thus,  participation  in  the  IEM  program  will 
necessitate  a  higher  discount  rate.  The  differences  between  the  maximum  values  of 
discount rates given export prices are not especially large or important when comparing 
values for     of 0.5 and 2.  These differences tend to  be heightened when a producer 
possesses a high coefficient of relative risk aversion   = 6 ( ).    
Note that an estimate of the maximum discount rate is not available when a producer 
is offered an export contract worth less than $28.50 per hl and  = 0.5. This is explained 
by the fact that the expected utility function becomes linear in the decision variable as    








$35.09 $29.54 $29.03 $28.50 $28.12 $26.83 $25.03
0.5   =
2   =
6   =
 
Figure 1  Maximum discount rate of production quotas that entails no participation in the IEM  
program for deliveries in May 2001 when average variable costs are $20 per hl. Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  M. Doyon, C. Brodeur and J-P. Gervais 
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between the export contract and the average variable cost, is decreasing with the export 
price. The latter two observations imply that the grid search algorithm is sensible to the 
choice  of  parameters  and  that  it  can  be  unstable.  This  remark  becomes  particularly 
relevant in instances in which the most profitable contract available is priced below the 
average variable cost. Under this condition, the optimization problem is degenerate since 
the net return of the risk-free asset is negative.   
Figure 2 illustrates the impact of producers’ efficiency on the  maximum discount 
rates. Consider a hypothetical producer that produces milk at a constant average variable 
cost  of  $16  per  hl.  A  decrease  in  average  variable  costs  in  the  model  has  the  same 
interpretation as a positive change in the initial wealth of the producer. In the current 
portfolio allocation model, production is fixed and the difference between the domestic 
price and marginal cost does not explain the valuation of production quotas by producers. 
Although costs do not directly explain quota values holding production fixed, they have a 
significant wealth effect with respect to the allocation of milk deliveries by producers.
5 
Constant relative risk preferences imply decreasing absolute risk aversion. In other words, 
as  wealth  increases,  a  producer  will  become  less  risk  averse.  The  maximum  annual 
discount  rate  of  a  producer  that  entails  no  participation  in  the  individual  export  milk 
program ranges from 8.4 percent to 8.8 percent depending on the producer’s preferences 









$35.09 $29.54 $29.03 $28.50 $28.12 $26.83 $25.03
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Figure 2  Maximum discount rate of production quotas that entails no participation in the IEM  
program for deliveries in May 2001 when average variable costs are $16 per hl. Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  M. Doyon, C. Brodeur and J-P. Gervais 
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profitable export contract is $28.12 per hl, the maximum annual discount rate ranges from 
10.9 percent to 11.6 percent at an efficiency level of $16 per hl. 
Figure 3 illustrates the trade-off between the discount rate of producers and export 
prices if average variable costs are $24 per hl. Convergence of the grid search algorithm 
fails when the second most profitable export contract in May 2001 is below $35.09 and 
risk aversion is not high (  = 0.5 or 2). However, the maximum discount rate that entails 
no participation in the IEM program ranges from 8.1 percent to 9.6 percent when producer 
risk preferences entail a relative risk aversion coefficient of 6.  
Simulations for May 2002 
The second period used in the simulation of the portfolio model relates to export decisions 
contracted in March 2002, a period of higher quota price, for deliveries occurring in May 
2002. The volume of contracts offered to producers during that month was much lower 
than a year earlier (9.1 million hl), but all contracts were accepted by producers.  
Given the lower export prices for that period, the numerical model can only yield 
valuable  answers  if  the  export  price  is  sufficiently  larger  than  the  producers’  average 
variable cost and/or the risk aversion coefficient is high. Figure 4 illustrates the maximum 
discount  rate  of  producers  that  does  not  entail  participation  in  the  IEM  for  the  four 
different export contract prices and risk aversion coefficients of 0.5, 2 and 6. A producer 
who is strongly risk averse    = 6 ( ) and produces at a constant marginal cost of $16 per hl 
will not accept an export contract valued at $32 unless he/she discounts the production 








$35.09 $29.54 $29.03 $28.50 $28.12 $26.83 $25.03
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Figure 3  Maximum discount rate of production quotas that entails no participation in the IEM  
program for deliveries in May 2001 when average variable costs are $24 per hl. Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  M. Doyon, C. Brodeur and J-P. Gervais 
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$20, the decision rule is not to participate in the IEM unless the discounting factor is 
higher  than  12  percent.  The  numerical  model  generally  fails  to  explain  the  actual 
marketing decisions of high-cost-of-production dairy producers in May 2002. A marginal 
cost of production of $20 or more makes the return of the risk-free asset in the model (the 
export market) insignificant; thus no sensible discount rate can explain participation in the 
IEM under these assumptions. 
Summary  
The main objective of this article is to estimate Quebec dairy producers’ quota discount 
rates conditional on some structural parameters related to risk preferences and technology. 
Results show that maximum annual discount rates that entail no participation in the export 
market range from approximately 8 percent to 12.5 percent in the months of May 2001 
and 2002. The precise estimate depends on a number of factors, such as the producers’ 
degree of risk aversion, producers’ cost efficiency and the non-stochastic return on the 
export market. These figures are relatively greater than the commercial risk-free interest 
rate on government bonds or returns on other risk-free assets sometimes used to discount 
quota values. Conversely, they are smaller than previously computed discount rates (e.g., 








$32.00 $21.49 $21.00 $20.00
2   =
6   =
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Figure 4  Maximum discount rate of production quotas that entails no participation in the IEM  
program for deliveries in May 2002 when average variable costs are $16 per hl.  Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  M. Doyon, C. Brodeur and J-P. Gervais 
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Endnotes 
1 We wish to thank Robert Romain, for providing valuable comments at the early stage of 
this research, as well as an anonymous reviewer. The standard disclaimer about remaining 
errors applies.  
2 Note that fixed costs in (1) are normalized to zero. This assumption is convenient for two 
reasons. First, given that output share is the relevant decision variable from the producers’ 
perspective, fixed costs have impacts in the analysis that cannot be distinguished from 
initial  wealth  impacts  in  the  current  stochastic  environment.  It  would  be  difficult  to 
pinpoint  with  confidence  the  fixed  costs  level  that  would  fairly  represent  a  large 
proportion of Quebec dairy producers. Second, the per-unit nature of the profit function 
would also require running simulations that are a function of the scale of production of 
various dairy farms. 
3 Note that total output of a dairy producer is determined by the size of the dairy cow herd; 
thus monthly hectolitres of milk produced are constant. The analysis is thus confined to a 
short-run perspective. Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  M. Doyon, C. Brodeur and J-P. Gervais 
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4 No attention must be devoted to the non-linear shape of the iso-line, given that prices of 
the export contracts are irregularly spaced on the horizontal axis.  
5 Using comparative static tools on the first-order condition of the maximization problem 
defined in (1), it can be shown that the share of production quota held by producers is 
increasing  (decreasing)  in  marginal  costs  when  absolute  risk  aversion  decreases 
(increases) with wealth. 